Democratic backsliding is fundamentally linked to the rise of right-wing populism. It is right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and their leaders that are at the forefront of undermining democratic institutions. They aim to capitalize on the dissatisfaction of people with the political system and their individual economic and social prospects and worries. Understanding the electoral success of RWPPs is crucial if we want to successfully safeguard liberal democracy.
The report Understanding Right-Wing Populism And What To Do About It presents a combination of empirical and qualitative analysis of right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) in 17 European countries.
In order to better understand the success of European right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) the report looks at the Three Ps:
Imagine a construction worker is concerned with the economic impact over immigration. Specifically, he is concerned with the effect low-skill immigration has on his labour market position. This would mean a lot of competition that might push down wages. Against this background, a RWPP is advocating a policy restricting immigration. The RWPP supplies the demand of the voter for addressing his economic concerns with a (policy) answer. Now imagine at the same time, previous governments have watered down employment protection legislation protecting his job. And this legislation would have minimized the economic risks he is facing from actually coming to pass. If another policy was in place this voter might have never voted for RWPP. One can easily imagine how the social policies in place (not) addressing this voter's (economic) concerns do also have an effect on his vote choice.
Find out below how exactly demand, supply and policies affect RWPP success.
A cooperation project with Daphne Halikiopoulou (University of Reading) and Tim Vlandas (University of Oxford).
If you are only interested in single country case studies, you can also individually download the regional comparative patterns below which are identical to the respective chapters in the full report. All downloads include a summary of the full report as well.
Western Europe: Germany, Austria and France
United Kingdom
Southern Europe: Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal
Italy
The Nordics: Denmark, Finland and Sweden
Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary and Slovenia
The Baltics: Estonia and Latvia
While we find that immigration is the most salient issue for people to vote RWPPs – the motivations supporting restrictions on immigration are not primarily driven by cultural concerns (9%) such as alleged threats to national identity. More RWPP voters are only concerned with the economic impact immigration has (15%), e.g. on the welfare state and labour market competition. And in fact, a relative majority of the right-wing populist electorate is not concerned at all about immigration (40%) or hold a mixed view of both economic and cultural immigration concerns (36%).
It is important to understand that the challenge for any party – be it centre-left or RWPP – is always to manage to appeal to voters that are beyond their core voter base. Core voters are those that always vote for a certain party and hold beliefs mostly similar to the core identity of a party. In the case of RWPPs this (historical) core are culturally motivated voters.
Peripheral voters are voters who potentially vote for a party if that party addresses one or more concerns these people face especially if those grievances increase and no other party is addressing them. These voters do not always vote for the same party and are often more centrist and not tied to one core block. In the case of RWPPs, these peripheral voters have economic concerns over immigration (and other issues).
Strategists should not only ask why certain voter groups vote for RWPPs. Knowing the reasons why people vote certain parties are important, but we also need to know how many people (among the electorate) actually hold such beliefs. We advocate looking at the size of voter groups. For any party, their periphery is always much larger than their core.
Individual parties are already marginally more successful than their competitors if they manage to galvanize their core voters while appealing to a significant number of voters in their periphery. This periphery is key to winning electorally and gaining in power and influence. As the hypothetical example below shows, RWPPs are successful if they manage to build a coalition between their (few) core culturally motivated voters and the large (!) voter group holding economic concerns.
Addressing RWPP voters may come at the expense of your own voter base (core) as these are often diametral opposed to the motivations of RWPP voters. Echoing other recent FES publications on this topic, the centre-left is much more at risk of alienating its own voter base (core) if it diverges from core progressive values such as equality, human rights, solidarity and non-discrimination as only few former centre-left voters in fact now vote RWPPs and many of those lost voters did switch because they favoured more progressive policies than the centre-left offered them.
Our report finds, for instance, women are significantly more likely to vote centre-left than men; people in the bottom income group are also less likely to vote centre-left. Men are in turn more likely to vote RWPPs. Even more likly are people with economic immigration concerns to vote RWPPs. For the full results see the comparative results of our empirical analyses on the characteristics affecting the probability to vote RWPPs and centre-left in Europe below.
Their populism is a feature of RWPPs' narrative and ideology but those parties are not primarily successful because they are populist. Their success beyond their core voter base stems from the fact that they manage to capitalise on the economic insecurities of the broader electorate with a nationalist and chauvinist social and welfare policy agenda. Progressive analyis should look at the actual economic risks and insecurities RWPP voters face and that drive them to support anti-establishment and populist parties, not purely the populist dimension of the phenomenon. It is the neglect of economic insecurities and the welfare retrenchment of the past that drives many people who might have used to subscribe to the political middle to vote RWPP. Our qualitative analysis of RWPPs in 17 European countries shows that successful RWPPs often have implemented or promoted social welfare expansions – albeit in a concerning nationalist and chauvinist manner.
Populism has its limits as an analytical category in explaining RWPP success. Is populism an ideology or only a communication style? Where does the democratic will of the people end and the tyranny of the majority begin? We rather recommend thinking of RWPPs as primarily nationalist parties in the sense that they prioritise an insider group over an outsider group in pursuit of preserving the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation.
We find two types of nationalism advocated by RWPPs:
Ethnic nationalism: A type of nationalism that draws on ascriptive- or biological- criteria of national belonging such as language, race, genealogy/community of birth and creed. Eastern European RWPPs are often ethnic nationalist basing their nationalism on the discrimination of (ethnic) minorities in their countries.
Civic nationalism: A type of nationalism that draws on voluntary- or ideological- criteria of national belonging, such as common institutions, territory, the economy and the law. Western European RWPPs are often civic nationalist discriminating minorities as a threat to a certain conception of ‘liberal’ or ‘secular’ democratic values.
The report shows that social policies in place addressing economic risks and insecurities have an effect on people’s voter choice. In general, generous social benefits decrease the support for RWPPs of the social groups receiving those benefits. This includes unemployment, sickness and family benefits. This shows economic insecurities are not a given, policies addressing them mediate the risk of RWPP success. Progressive politics protecting and and expanding the welfare state thus also safeguard from future RWPP success.
For social policies to migitate RWPP success they need to be encompassing. Many potential RWPP voters are concerned about economic risks they are facing. Policies may either protect them from those risks altogether if they reduce those risks. Policies may also compensate them for the risks that have come to pass. Our results show if both protective and compensatory policies are in place the group affected is less likely to vote RWPPs. E.g. If the unemployed are both protected by generous employment protection legislation and compensated by high unemployment benefits, they are less likely to vote for RWPPs.
Centre-left parties should not be fooled into thinking they can simply copy the RWPP success playbook by going fully populist and embracing restrictive immigration policies and questions of national identity. Instead, they should appeal to the economic insecurities that many peripheral RWPP voters are concerned about focusing on an issue the centre-left ‘owns’ such as equality.
Successful centre-left strategies manage to galvanize the centre-left's core voter base addressing the (economic) grievances that concern much larger parts of the whole electorate than the RWPP electorate. The core (culturalist) RWPP electorate is only a niche of the whole electorate and not reachable with centre-left ideas.
While being a common phenomenon, there is not one single RWPP success formula. Our analysis finds regional patterns and different voter basis and grievances driving RWPP success across Europe. Progressive strategies addressing those necessarily face different obstacles depending on the context. For instance, the Western European centre-left has better chances of focusing on welfare expansion as an issue they ‚own‘ than many counterparts in Eastern Europe who have lost the ownership of those issues to RWPPs that promote distorted nationalist and chauvinist versions of the same ideas.
30/05/2022Agenda Publica (English)https://agendapublica.elpais.com/noticia/18006/understanding-right-wing-populism-and-what-to-do-about-it
01/06/2022LSE Blog (English)https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/06/01/understanding-right-wing-populism-and-what-to-do-about-it
10/07/2022SEN Blog (English)http://senjournal.co.uk/2022/07/10/blog-post-nationalism-and-welfare-chauvinism-right-wing-populism-in-europe-and-the-2022-french-presidential-elections
25/04/2022Snyopsis (Greek/Cyprus)https://synopsis.simplecast.com/episodes/france-presidentialelections
23/04/2022 Dagens Nyheter (Swedish)https://www.dn.se/varlden/hogerpopulister-bland-toppnamnen-i-helgens-val-i-europa
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