

ITALY



ITALY
Lega



CONTENT

3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN EUROPE
PATTERNS OF RWPP SUCCESS ACROSS EUROPE
WHY IS RIGHT-WING POPULISM SUCCESSFUL?
HOW SHOULD PROGRESSIVES RESPOND? POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

8

ITALY
PATTERNS OF SUCCESS

10

PARTY PROFILES
LEGA (NORD)

12

ANALYSIS
UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OF RWPPS IN ITALY

15

RECOMMENDATIONS
HOW SHOULD PROGRESSIVES RESPOND?

18

REFERENCES

IMPRINT

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Daphne Halikiopoulou is Professor of Comparative Politics at University of Reading. She has published extensively on nationalism and the cultural and economic determinants of right-wing populist parties support.

Tim Vlandas is Associate Professor of Comparative Social Policy in the Department of Social Policy and Intervention and Fellow of St Antony’s College at University of Oxford. His research explores the political and economic determinants and consequences of social and economic policies in Europe.

FES REGIONAL OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
DEMOCRACY OF THE FUTURE

Reichsratsstraße 13/5, A-1010 Vienna

RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTENT: Johanna Lutz, Director, Democracy of the Future

PROJECT LEAD: Michael Jennewein, Researcher for Democracy & Economics

Project website: <https://democracy.fes.de/topics/right-wing-populism>

Contact: democracy.vienna@fes.de

DESIGN: Caroline Plank-Bachseltens | www.bueroblack.at

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. Commercial use of media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

This publication consists of identical chapters of the full FES report

UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

ISBN: 978-3-98628-156-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN EUROPE

Since the early 2010s, right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) have been on the rise across Europe. This development has taken place at the expense of the mainstream: while the average electoral score of RWPPs has been steadily increasing over time, support for both the mainstream left and right has declined.

The right-wing populist momentum sweeping Europe since the early 2010s has three features:

1. ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Many RWPPs have improved their electoral performance over time. The French Rassemblement National (RN) (formerly Front National - FN), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Greek Golden Dawn (GD) and the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) have all increasingly managed to mobilise voters beyond their core support groups. Countries previously identified as ‘outliers’ because of the absence of an electorally successful RWPP are no longer exceptional in this respect – for example, Portugal with the rise of Chega and Spain with the rise of Vox.

2. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT

A substantial number of RWPPs have either recently been part of governing coalitions, or served as formal cooperation partners in right-wing minority governments. These include the Lega (Italy), the FPÖ, the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), the Hungarian Fidesz, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and Independent Greeks (ANEL), the Finns Party (PS), the Danish People’s Party (DF), the National Alliance (NA) (Latvia) and the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE).

3. ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE POLICY AGENDA

RWPPs such as the RN (France), the SD (Sweden) and UKIP (UK) have successfully competed in their domestic systems, permeating mainstream ground and influencing the agendas of other parties. As a result, mainstream parties on the right and, in some instances, on the left have often adopted accommodative strategies – mainly regarding immigration.

PATTERNS OF RWPP SUCCESS ACROSS EUROPE

A close look at the parties' support trajectories reveals interesting regional patterns:

WESTERN EUROPE

In much of Western Europe, RWPP success takes the form of systemic entrenchment – i.e. the gradual ability of niche parties to permeate mainstream ground. Most Western European RWPPs commenced as niche actors operating on the fringes of the political system. They increased their support beyond their secure voter base by becoming progressively embedded in the system either as coalition partners or as credible opposition parties.

SOUTHERN EUROPE

RWPP success has varied significantly across Southern European countries. Greece has had RWPPs both in government (LAOS, ANEL) and opposition (GD). In contrast, RWPPs in Cyprus, Spain and Portugal for a long time failed to make substantial electoral gains despite economic grievances and immigration. But this trend is changing. These countries are no longer 'exceptional' cases. ELAM has gradually increased its support in Cyprus. Spain and Portugal have been experiencing the rise of Vox and Chega, respectively.

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

The Nordic countries have witnessed considerable RWPP success. The Danish DF has exerted substantial policy influence as a recognised cooperation partner of the centre-right parties since the early 2000s. The Finns Party (PS) turned in its first good result in 2007, making its electoral breakthrough in 2011, and in 2015 even joining a centre-right coalition government. In Sweden – a 'deviant' case until recently – the Sweden Democrats' (SD) achieved their electoral breakthrough in 2010. While a *cordon sanitaire* strategy has kept them out of government, this consensus may be changing, as the SD has recently become more influential in local coalitions.

EASTERN EUROPE

Eastern Europe has some of the most electorally successful RWPPs, including Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and the NA in Latvia. The dominant pattern is a radicalisation of the mainstream. Formerly mainstream parties have radicalised in government, increasingly adopting populist, illiberal and authoritarian policy positions. Given the low levels of immigration in the region, Eastern European RWPPs tend to target domestic minorities. In the more ethnically homogenous countries such as Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, mobilisation occurs along socially conservative lines. In the more ethnically pluralistic societies, such as Estonia and Latvia, RWPPs have mobilised against larger politicised ethnic groups, most notably the Russian minorities that reside in these countries.

UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OF RWPPS

What factors are influencing support for RWPPs across Europe? Conventional wisdom emphasises the political climate of RWPP normalisation and systemic entrenchment, where issues 'owned' by these parties are salient: immigration, nationalism and cultural grievances. The importance of cultural values in shaping voting behaviour and the strong empirical association of cultural concerns over immigration and RWPP support at the individual level have led to an emerging consensus that the increasing success of RWPPs can be best understood as a 'cultural backlash' (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020).

This report contests the view that the rise of right-wing populism should be predominantly understood as a 'cultural backlash'. A sole focus on culture overlooks:

- (1) the predictive power of economic concerns over immigration and the critical distinction between galvanising a core constituency on the one hand and mobilising more broadly beyond this core constituency on the other (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020)
- (2) the strategies RWPPs themselves are pursuing to capitalise on multiple insecurities, including both cultural and economic; and
- (3) the role of social policies in mitigating those insecurities that drive RWPP support.

To address these issues, the report looks at three levels – what we call the Three Ps: People, Parties and Policies:

1. People: How do cultural and economic grievances affect individuals' likelihood of voting for a RWPP? How are those grievances distributed among the RWPP electorate? And how does this distribution compare to the distribution of the same types of grievances among the centre-left and the entire country electorates?



2. Parties: What strategies do RWPPs adopt to capitalise on their core and peripheral electorates? How do they employ nationalism, populism and welfarism in their narratives and programmatic agendas?



3. Policies: Do policies matter, and if so, what type of policies can mitigate the economic risks driving different social groups within the electorate to support RWPPs?



We address these questions using empirical evidence from both quantitative and qualitative analyses. First, we perform statistical analyses using nine waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) to analyse objective and subjective individual characteristics associated with RWPPs' support and thus identify the conditions that drive the RWPP vote at the individual level (demand). Second, we analyse RWPP manifestos using the Comparative Manifestos Project (MARPOR) dataset to map RWPP positions and identify the supply-side conditions that facilitate their success (supply). Third, we draw on our research matching ESS data with social policy datasets to determine the extent to which social policies mediate the risks that drive individuals to vote RWPP (policy).

OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS THE FOLLOWING

At the **people** level, both cultural and economic concerns over immigration increase the likelihood of voting for an RWPP. While cultural concerns are often a stronger predictor of RWPP voting behaviour, this does not automatically mean that they matter more for RWPP success in substantive terms because people driven by economic concerns are often a numerically larger group. The main issue to pay attention to here is **size**: both the size of the effect, and also the size of the voter groups that are subject to this effect. Voters primarily concerned with the cultural impact of immigration are core RWPP voters. Although they might be highly likely to vote RWPP, they also tend to be a numerically small group. By contrast, voters that are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration are peripheral voters. They are also highly likely to vote for RWPP, but in addition they are a numerically larger group. Since the interests and preferences of these two groups can differ, successful RWPPs tend to be those that are able to attract both groups. What determines RWPP success is therefore the ability to mobilise a coalition of interests between core and peripheral voters (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020).

At the **party** level, we emphasise the importance of nationalism, as opposed to populism, as a mobilisation tool that has facilitated RWPP success. We argue that RWPPs in Western Europe employ a **civic nationalist** normalisation strategy that allows them to offer nationalist solutions to all types of insecurities that drive voting behaviour (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). This strategy has two features. First, it presents culture as a value issue and justifies exclusion on ideological grounds; and second a focus on social welfare and emphasis on welfare chauvinism. Eastern European RWPPs, on the other hand, remain largely **ethnic nationalist**, focusing on ascriptive criteria of national belonging and mobilising voters on socially conservative positions and a rejection of minority rights.

At the **policy** level, this report documents the previously overlooked importance of welfare state institutions (Rathgeb and Busemeyer 2021; Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2021). Our analysis illustrates that welfare state policies moderate a range of economic risks individuals face. This reduces the likelihood of support for RWPPs among insecure individuals – for example, the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers and employees on temporary contracts. Our key point here is that political actors have agency and can shape political outcomes: to understand why some individuals vote for RWPPs, we should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.

HOW SHOULD PROGRESSIVES RESPOND? POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Our analysis suggests that co-opting right-wing populist policy agendas is, by and large, not a winning strategy for the centre-left. This finding is consistent with the recent literature suggesting that the centre-left and RWPP electorates are considerably different (Abou Chadi et al. 2021) and that employing accommodative RWPP ‘copycat’ strategies may attract a small number of RWPP voters, but alienate a much larger proportion of their own voters (Chou et al. 2021).

The current hype about ‘new’ issues such as immigration and cultural grievances often overlooks significant economic concerns among voters. Indeed, a large share of the electorate is concerned about inequality. These concerns are not niche, nor are they confined to a shrinking voter group that is becoming irrelevant. Even within the context of emerging cleavages, inequalities are embedded in – and shape the salience of – ‘new’ issues.

Instead, a more beneficial strategy for the centre-left is to try to (re)capture these voters by reclaiming ownership of (in)equality. Articulating a vision of an equitable society will allow progressive parties to re-build their broad voter coalitions and pioneer a strategy that mobilises voters on an issue the left already ‘owns’.

ITALY




Lega

PATTERNS OF SUCCESS

RWPPs in Italy have received consistently high levels of support since the 1970s and have participated in government coalitions on numerous occasions. The Italian case resembles other Western European countries such as Austria, Switzerland and Denmark, where RWPPs have a long-standing tradition of being accepted as legitimate political actors by voters and mainstream political parties alike.

RWPP participation in government in Italy is not new. What set the 2018 elections apart from past years was that two anti-establishment parties – RWPP Lega Nord and the populist Five Star Movement – made significant electoral gains and formed a ‘populist’ coalition government. This development took place at the expense of mainstream political actors, who were the biggest losers of the election.


Figure 1: RWPP national election history in Italy 2000-2021



DEMAND: WHO VOTES FOR RWPPS IN ITALY?


RWPP voting behaviour in Italy during the 2010s has been driven by multiple and overlapping crises: rising unemployment, low levels of trust in institutions and parties, and the perception of immigrants and refugees as a threat. Support for Salvini’s Lega reflected a successful campaign mobilising on EU discontent with strong anti-immigration and anti-establishment messages, calling for restrictive border policies and changes in the EU’s economic governance programme. Our empirical analysis confirms that older male individuals with cultural concerns over immigration are more likely to vote for RWPPs.

Figure 2: Who is the most likely right-wing populist party voter?



Probability to vote for a Right Wing Populist Party (%)

Figure 3: Who is the least likely right-wing populist party voter?



Probability to vote for a Right Wing Populist Party (%)

SUPPLY: WHAT MAKES LEGA’S NARRATIVE SUCCESSFUL?

Italy’s Lega is a distinct case of a ‘regional going national’ party (Albertazzi et al. 2018). Lega can no longer be classified as a regional party, as under Salvini it has managed to establish its presence across Italy, infiltrating new areas, including the South (Albertazzi et al. 2018). This programmatic and rhetorical shift from regionalism to immigration scepticism and anti-EU nationalism has allowed the party to broaden and diversify its electoral base, appealing to voters of other parties, including the left.

PARTY PROFILES

LEGA (NORD)

Founded in 1991, the Lega Nord has served in coalition governments on numerous occasions, including 1994-1996, 2001-2005, 2008-2011 and 2018-2019. The party's electoral performance in 2018 was its best ever, with over 17 per cent of the national vote, which is seven percentage points more than its previous best result in 1996 (10.1%).


CHANGING VALUES: FROM REGIONALISM TO ANTI-IMMIGRANT NATIONALISM

The Lega Nord is unique in Western Europe in that it has transitioned from regionalism to anti-immigrant nationalism. This transition is marked by the following programmatic features: (1) the dismissal (or de-prioritisation) of the territorial elements of the party's ideology; (2) a type of nationalism that focuses on immigration, but does not address social and economic issues related to the North-South divide; and (3), the substitution of Rome by the EU as the 'enemy of the people' (Albertazzi et al. 2018).

Under Umberto Bossi's leadership (1991-2012), the Lega Nord was a regionalist-populist party focusing on two issues: (1) the economic and social gap between Italy's wealthy North and less affluent South; and (2) the growing sense of discontent with political elites. As a regional party, the Lega Nord primarily demanded regional power rather than claiming to represent the whole country's interests. Its nationalism focused on calls for autonomy, advocating a territorial cause and defending the interests of its regions as opposed to those of the entire country.

Lega has undergone significant transformations under the leadership of Matteo Salvini (since 2013). The party has significantly de-prioritised calls for the autonomy of northern Italian regions and, instead, focused on Italy as a whole, positioning itself staunchly against multiculturalism and the EU (Figure 4). Reflecting this change, Salvini dropped 'Nord' from the party's symbol and fielded candidates all across Italy in 2018. In order to broaden its electorate, Lega has also explicitly embraced traditional Catholic messages and iconography against Islam and LGBT and in defence of the traditional family (Meardi and Guadiancich 2021).


Figure 4: Lega's and Fdl's stance on euroscepticism and multiculturalism



FROM FREE MARKET TO STATE INTERVENTION: LEGA'S SOCIAL POLICY U-TURNS

Overall, Lega's economic and welfare policy positions have been inconsistent over time, characterised by continuous U-turns (Figure 5). The party does not clearly outline its social policy stances, often oscillating between free market and pro-welfare policy positions. On the one hand, it has traditionally positioned itself in favour of neoliberal policies supporting low and flat taxes. Before its shift from regional to anti-immigrant nationalism, this was mainly in line with supporting the interests of its main target group: small and medium-sized businesses in the Northern regions of Italy. On the other hand, the party's programmatic shift has generated the need to also appeal more broadly to include voters in the poorer regions of the Italian south. As such, under Salvini's leadership Lega has flirted with certain protectionist and pro-welfare policies. This is especially true during the party's time in office. Consistent with the expectation that RWPPs in power place substantial focus on social policy, Lega was instrumental in passing the pro-welfare Citizens' Income – a Basic Minimum Income policy – and introducing 'quota 100' – an early retirement scheme for those aged at least 62 as part of the League-M5S government of 2018-2019 (Meardi and Guardiancich 2021). Following the party's transition from government to opposition post-2019, however, Lega has criticised Citizens' Income measures on the grounds that they are harmful for the economy.

Figure 5: Lega's and Fdl's stance on the left-right spectrum, welfare expansion, planned economy, market regulation, and the free market



ANALYSIS

UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OF RWPPS IN ITALY

In many Western European countries such as Germany, Spain and Portugal, their fascist past has served as a deterrent for RWPPs. Italy, again, does not fit into this pattern. Despite the country's fascist past, Italian RWPPs have received consistently high levels of electoral support since the 1970s and have played substantial roles in governments. Their success may be understood both in terms of receiving votes and influencing policy as legitimate political actors. Italy shares these features with Western European countries such as Austria and Switzerland, which have long-standing traditions of RWPP participation in governments (Caramani and Manucci 2019).

The Italian right-wing political space is, like Greece and Spain, highly fragmented. The line between the moderate right and the RWPP is often blurred. Many RWPPs and groups ranging from the more extreme to radical variants and borderline cases participate in Italian politics. For instance, the Casa Pound is a neo-fascist, nationalist, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and anti-capitalism movement that operates predominantly outside the context of parliamentary politics. The group originated in the 2003 squatting of a building in the centre of Rome by a group of young neo-fascists and takes its name from the American poet Ezra Pound. It defines itself as 'fascist', deriving from the fascist tradition and transcending traditional left/right categories (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2014). While it emphasises the labour element of its fascist ideology, it downplays the stigmatised aspects such as anti-Semitism and racism (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2014). Although not electorally successful, the Casa Pound is present in all Italian regions and has a visible presence as a grass-roots movement in Italy.


Within the parliamentary framework, a broad range of RWPPs have competed in elections with varying levels of success. The Lega participated in numerous centre-right governments (1994-1996, 2001-2005 and 2008-2011) before forming an anti-establishment coalition with the Five Star Movement in 2018. The National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), the successor of the post-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), also participated in Berlusconi's coalitions several times. On the more extreme end of the political spectrum, the neo-fascist Tricolour Flame (Fiamma Tricolore) and Forza Nuova have both competed on a far-right agenda.

More recently, the RWPP Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) has placed additional pressures on Silvio Berlusconi's centre-right Go Italy/Forza Italia (FI), contributing to the rise of the anti-establishment right and the decline of the mainstream. The party ran its 2019 European Parliament (EP) electoral campaign on tax reduction and strengthening military controls on external European borders, abandoning austerity and enforcing EU-wide protection of Italian products. This campaign gained the party 5 EP seats (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2020).

Despite the long-standing tradition of RWPP in attracting popular support and playing a part in mainstream politics, the 2018 elections may still be characterised as 'breakthrough' elections given their implications for Italian politics and, more specifically, the rise of anti-establishment politics at the expense of the mainstream. Our empirical analysis of RWPP voting patterns in Italy across time (2002-2018) confirms that older, male individuals who are not in the bottom income group or on unemployment benefits, but instead have income from investments, are more likely to vote for RWPPs. These individuals have intermediate education levels, only moderate trust in EU institutions¹ and cultural concerns over immigration (Figure 7). The increased politicisation of the immigration issue since the 2015 migration crisis changed the salience of the issue among the public, significantly advantaging Lega, which had by that point transformed from a regional into a fully-fledged anti-immigration RWPP party (Dennison and Geddes 2021). Among Lega's electorate, a substantial proportion of voters have both cultural and economic concerns over immigration, while some have no concerns at all, suggesting the presence of multiple routes to the Lega vote (Figure 6).


Negative perceptions towards immigration reflect a long-term difficulty in developing a migration policy consistent with the presence of significant immigrant populations in Italy (Dennison and Geddes 2021). In other words, the political economy of contemporary Italian politics does not reflect the realities of the country's immigrant population. While migrant workers are key to several areas of economic activity, there are no equivalent routes for regular non-EU migration (Dennison and Geddes 2021). The politicisation and increased salience of this issue has led to the simultaneous decline of the centre-right political space and rise of RWPPs.

Figure 6: Distribution of immigration concerns



¹ Although the medium level of trust in the EU is associated with higher support for RWPP, when running a continuous version of European Parliament trust the association is negative and significant consistent with notion that overall Euroscepticism is positively associated with support for RWPP in Italy

Figure 7: Characteristics affecting the probability to vote



Only statistically significant results are shown.

HOW TO READ THESE GRAPHS

The graphs **characteristics affecting the probability to vote** frequently appear in this report. They all show the significant coefficients of the regression analyses of our empirical analyses for a specific party family and region. Here you see for instance *the characteristics affecting the probability to vote FOR right-wing populist parties IN Italy*. The arrow icon in the top left corner pointing to the right indicates the respective party family shown in this particular graph (here: right-wing populist parties).

In the graph itself you see what objective (e.g. gender; age) and attitudinal (e.g. economic immigration concerns) characteristics make people more or less likely to vote for a party family and how big that effect is (indicated by the size of the orange and purple bars). The effect is always shown in relation to a reference category (e.g. men in relation to women; people with medium level of education in relation to people with low level of education).

RECOMMENDATIONS


HOW SHOULD PROGRESSIVES RESPOND?

How should progressive parties in Italy respond? Our comparison of the RWPP and centre-left electorates in Italy suggests that co-opting RWPP positions will likely be costly for the progressive left. This finding is consistent with recent literature, which suggests that the centre-left and RWPP electorates are considerably different (Abou Chadi et al. 2021) and that centre-left repositioning towards RWPP restrictive immigration policies may attract a small number of RWPP voters, but alienate a much larger proportion of their own voters (Chou et al. 2021).

First, RWPP core voters, i.e. those voters who oppose immigration on principle and have strong cultural concerns over immigration, are a minority in Italy, taking up 10% of the whole electorate (Figure 8). These voters are principled RWPP voters and are unlikely to switch to the centre-left even if it adopts ‘copycat’ strategies. They identify more staunchly with a right-wing platform and are more likely to switch from ‘far’ to centre-right. They are the least likely centre-left constituency and do not constitute a centre-left target voter group.

Second, a comparison between the RWPP and centre-left voter profiles (Figure 9) shows considerable differences. Older, wage-earning individuals who are professionals or craft or agricultural workers, more educated, trust the EU and have favourable attitudes towards immigration are more likely to vote for the centre-left. These individuals are unlikely to be attracted to culturalist anti-immigrant narratives. Indeed, the RWPP signature theme has very little prevalence among the centre-left electorate (Figure 8), as only 7% of centre-left voters have cultural concerns over immigration.


Figure 8: Distribution of immigration concerns



Third, even among the RWPP electorate, individuals with exclusively cultural concerns over immigration (i.e. core voters) are a minority (14%). The RWPP electorate in Italy is composed of a significant percentage of people with either no immigration concerns (33%) or combined economic and cultural concerns (45%) (Figure 6). This suggests the majority of RWPP voters are protest or peripheral voters, i.e. voters whose opposition to immigration is contingent. These voters are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration and tend to support the populist right as a way of expressing their discontent. They likely feel economically insecure and may have lost trust in institutions and the political system both at the domestic and EU levels. Because they have salient inequality concerns – broadly defined – and have no principled opposition to immigration, these voters can ‘switch’ to parties that emphasise issues related to equality and offer effective policy solutions to them. This voter group is a more likely centre-left target constituency through a broader ‘equality’ narrative.

Fourth, immigration concerns are not salient among the centre-left electorate, as indeed 67% of centre-left voters have no immigration concerns at all (Figure 8). This suggests that the centre-left voter constituency is not sympathetic to the RWPP agenda and will likely abandon the party if it shifts further to the nationalist right. This picture reveals a non-beneficial trade-off: the adoption of nationalist anti-immigration positions by the mainstream left will likely result in substantial losses of the left’s own cosmopolitan, urban pro-immigrant voters in exchange for very small – if any – gains from the RWPP electorate, whose cultural core voter is a principled right-wing voter who is highly unlikely to vote for the centre-left even if it adopts ‘copycat’ policies.

Figure 9: Characteristics affecting the probability to vote



Only statistically significant results are shown.

REFERENCES

Abou-Chadi, T., R. Mittereger and C. Mudde (2021). Left Behind by the working class? Social democracy's electoral crisis and the rise of the radical right, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Albertazzi, D., A. Giovannini and A. Seddone (2018). No regionalism please, we are Leghisti !' The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, *Regional & Federal Studies*, 28:5, 645-671.

Caramani, D. and L. Manucci (2019). National past and populism: the re-elaboration of fascism and its impact on right-wing populism in Western Europe, *West European Politics*, 42:6, 1159-1187.

Castelli Gattinara, P. and C. Froio (2014). Discourse and Practice of Violence in the Italian Extreme Right: Frames, Symbols, and Identity-Building in Casa Pound Italia, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 8 (1).

Castelli Gattinara, P. and C. Froio (2020). Italy: Political development and data in 2019. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook*, 59(1).

Chou, W., R. Dancygier, N. Egami and AA. Jamal (2021). Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting. *Comparative Political Studies*. 54(12):2226-2260.

Dennison, J. and A. Geddes (2021). The centre no longer holds: the Lega, Matteo Salvini and the remaking of Italian immigration politics, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Extreme Right: Frames, Symbols, and Identity-Building in Casa Pound Italia, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 8 (1) 2014

Halikiopoulou, D. and T. Vlandas (2020). When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe. *European Political Science Review* 12(4): 427-448.

Halikiopoulou, D., S. Mock and S. Vasilopoulou (2013). The civic zeitgeist: nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right. *Nations and Nationalism* 19(1): 107-127.

Meardi, G. and I. Guardiancich (2021). Back to the familialist future: the rise of social policy for ruling populist radical right parties in Italy and Poland. *West European Politics*.

Norris, P. and R. Inglehart (2019). Cultural backlash : Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian-populism.

Rathgeb, P. and M. R. Busemeyer (2021). How to study the populist radical right and the welfare state? *West European Politics*.

Vlandas, T. and D. Halikiopoulou (2021). Welfare state policies and far right party support: moderating 'insecurity effects' among different social groups. *West European Politics*.

**FRIEDRICH
EBERT 
STIFTUNG**