Right-Wing Populism

Addressing RWPP voters may come at the expense of your own voter base (core) as these are often diametral opposed to the motivations of RWPP voters. Echoing other recent FES publications on this topic, the centre-left is much more at risk of alienating its own voter base (core) if it diverges from core progressive values such as equality, human rights, solidarity and non-discrimination as only few former centre-left voters in fact now vote RWPPs and many of those lost voters did switch because they favoured more progressive policies than the centre-left offered them. 

Our report finds, for instance, women are significantly more likely to vote centre-left than men; people in the bottom income group are also less likely to vote centre-left. Men are in turn more likely to vote RWPPs. Even more likly are people with economic immigration concerns to vote RWPPs. For the full results see the comparative results of our empirical analyses on the characteristics affecting the probability to vote RWPPs and centre-left in Europe below.

Their populism is a feature of RWPPs' narrative and ideology but those parties are not primarily successful because they are populist. Their success beyond their core voter base stems from the fact that they manage to capitalise on the economic insecurities of the broader electorate with a nationalist and chauvinist social and welfare policy agenda. Progressive analyis should look at the actual economic risks and insecurities RWPP voters face and that drive them to support anti-establishment and populist parties, not purely the populist dimension of the phenomenon. It is the neglect of economic insecurities and the welfare retrenchment of the past that drives many people who might have used to subscribe to the political middle to vote RWPP. Our qualitative analysis of RWPPs in 17 European countries shows that successful RWPPs often have implemented or promoted social welfare expansions – albeit in a concerning nationalist and chauvinist manner.

Populism has its limits as an analytical category in explaining RWPP success. Is populism an ideology or only a communication style? Where does the democratic will of the people end and the tyranny of the majority begin? We rather recommend thinking of RWPPs as primarily nationalist parties in the sense that they prioritise an insider group over an outsider group in pursuit of preserving the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation.

We find two types of nationalism advocated by RWPPs:

Ethnic nationalism: A type of nationalism that draws on ascriptive- or biological- criteria of national belonging such as language, race, genealogy/community of birth and creed. Eastern European RWPPs are often ethnic nationalist basing their nationalism on the discrimination of (ethnic) minorities in their countries.

Civic nationalism: A type of nationalism that draws on voluntary- or ideological- criteria of national belonging, such as common institutions, territory, the economy and the law. Western European RWPPs are often civic nationalist discriminating minorities as a threat to a certain conception of ‘liberal’ or ‘secular’ democratic values.

For social policies to migitate RWPP success they need to be encompassing. Many potential RWPP voters are concerned about economic risks they are facing. Policies may either protect them from those risks altogether if they reduce those risks. Policies may also compensate them for the risks that have come to pass. Our results show if both protective and compensatory policies are in place the group affected is less likely to vote RWPPs. E.g. If the unemployed are both protected by generous employment protection legislation and compensated by high unemployment benefits, they are less likely to vote for RWPPs.